

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Claim Numbers: HQ08X01180,

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

HQ08X01416

HQ08X03220

HQ08X01686

B E T W E E N :

- (1) BISHAR AL RAWI
- (2) JAMIL EL BANNA
- (3) RICHARD BELMAR
- (4) OMAR DEGHAYES
- (5) BINYAM MOHAMMED
- (6) MARTIN MUBANGA

Claimants

and

- (1) THE SECURITY SERVICE
- (2) THE SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
- (3) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
- (4) THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
- (5) THE HOME OFFICE

Defendants

EXHIBIT LC15

Notes by Birnberg Peirce on SyS & FCO Open Disclosure

SyS Open Deghayes Schedule 1 Documents

1. There is substantial duplication throughout this file. 12 of the 27 documents are listed as duplicates. In addition some of the documents have been reformatted and sent to different recipients but have the same content throughout the body of the document. Alternatively, some documents have been cut and pasted as sections into a new document. As a result, the file only contains 15 documents once the duplication is accounted for.
2. There are heavy (more than 70%) redactions of 15 of the 27 documents. Further, some of the redactions appear to be unnecessary. In total, 23 of the 34 paragraphs have been entirely redacted. An example of what appears to be unnecessary redactions is found at paragraph 31 of document 1 (page 275). Here the opinion as to Mr Deghayes character, believability and his fitting "the pattern of a mujahid recruited in the UK" are left in, although the proceeding paragraphs providing the facts for this opinion, at pages 273-274, are redacted.
3. In document 7 (and document 18, a duplicate) at paragraph 3, page 276, Mr Deghayes asks the interviewer about "home, particularly the weather, football and Muslim/non-Muslim relations. He states that "GTMO was better than Bagram." The entire remainder of the document consisting of 16 further paragraphs, from pages 277 to 278, is redacted. This appears to be a self serving retention.
4. The text from document 8 has been transcribed into document 10 between headings "Text Begins" at page 280 and "Text Ends" at the bottom of page 285. Thereafter, from the bottom of page 285 to page

290, the document is entirely redacted. Given that the document is described as a “briefing for interview” and in the heavily redacted paragraph 2 on page 279, the author suggests that the recipient “press him hard on [redacted], “press him on his experiences in Bosnia” and “quiz him on his recent travel,” it could be inferred that the last pages of the document contain guidance or further instructions for interviewing Mr Deghayes.

5. Document 20 is a duplicate of document 2. However, document 20 contains a handwritten page, at page 291, that says simply: “page missing from [redacted] copy.” However, there is no corresponding note for a missing page in document 2. A page is clearly missing in document 2 because there is a gap shown here at pages 292 and 293 which jump from paragraph 8 to paragraph 14.

SyS Open Belmar Schedule 1 Documents

6. Again, there is a substantial amount of repetition through the documents. For instance, document 19 and document 25 appear to contain the same un-redacted substance, including the repetition of the spelling mistake “pier pressure” at pages 294 and 295. In all, 5 of the 42 documents are described as duplicates.
7. Most of the documents, 33 of the 42, are heavily redacted (more than 70%). For example, document 40, at pages 296 to 299, is almost entirely redacted.
8. In document 3 at page 300, paragraphs 29 and 30 are redacted except for the statement “The problem is what happens next.” Paragraph 28 precedes this statement by speaking about Mr Belmar’s involvement not

being much deeper than he had let on and that he is "genuine in his disillusionment with jihad." Taken from the context of these statements, it would seem that the Defendants have redacted their role in what happens next to Mr Belmar.

9. In document 2, page 301, the end of paragraph 37 states that "Belmar never saw his passport again." The lack of any previous mention of the passport seems to indicate that the previous redacted sentence says something about what happened to his passport. The justification for redacting this is unclear.
10. Both document 5 (pages 302-303) and document 7 (pages 304-305) are listed in the index as FOC letters about Moazzam Begg and Richard Begg. However, Mr Begg's name has been obviously redacted in the content of the letters in the header and the last sentence. This appears to be unnecessary.
11. In document 6 at page 306, paragraph 23 states that Mr Belmar provided information about activities in his past and in Afghanistan and that information is provided in the following paragraphs (pages 306-308). However, the entirety of those following ten paragraphs is completely redacted. As this appears to be Mr Belmar's own account, the justification of redacting this before disclosure to this claimant is unclear.

FCO Open Disclosure Schedule

12. 40% of the documents disclosed have been so heavily redacted that the nature of the document has been obscured. For example, pages 309-311, is a letter that simply starts 'Dear Colin' and ends, 'yours ever Jack'.



THE SECURITY SERVICE

TEL: [REDACTED]

FAX: [REDACTED]

was the only thing that was untrue about what he had said. It was Abu Bakr who had travelled to Libya and he had done so in order to see his family (Abu Bakr was still married to his children's mother). Incredulity was once again expressed about this, but DEGHAYES insisted it was true, and that Abu Bakr had been imprisoned. [REDACTED]

20. [REDACTED]

21. [REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED]

Bosnia

23. DEGHAYES admitted having been to Bosnia for 2-3 months, specifically Zagreb. He insisted he worked only with the NGO Human Concern and had not fought in the Katiba. [REDACTED]

24. [REDACTED]



THE SECURITY SERVICE

TEL: [REDACTED]

FAX: [REDACTED]

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

Conclusion

30.



THE SECURITY SERVICE

TEL: [REDACTED]

FAX: [REDACTED]

Comments

31. DEGHAYES turned out to be a surprisingly forceful character whose denials of anything beyond a superficial involvement in the LIFG were robust - although not believable. He is obviously lying about the depth and extent of his involvement. He fits the pattern of a mujahid recruited in the UK, although it was interesting that he spent so long in Afghanistan

[REDACTED]

His apparent acceptance of the possibility of repatriation to Libya was surprising as he had appeared [REDACTED] sufficiently worried during this interview to lie outrageously about his identity.

32.

33.

34.

[REDACTED]

LOOSE MINUTE

To: [REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED]
Ext No: [REDACTED]

Date: 17 June 2003

File Ref: [REDACTED]
Copied To: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: GTMO interview with Omar DEGHAYES.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FOR ADDRESSES INFORMATION ONLY.

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED OR USED WITHOUT
PRIOR REFERENCE TO [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] interviewed Omar DEGHAYES on 28/4/03, 0730 to 0945, in Camp Delta, GTMO. Also observing was [REDACTED]
2. DEGHAYES began the interview with a hostile attitude, stating that he wanted to know what crime he had committed and what charges were being made against him. He riled for some time against the system which detained him and the US legal basis for it. He stated that he would not talk to us as he was not a MI5 spy and had spoken to [REDACTED] colleague several times in Bagram. He stated that the UK government should be working for UK nationals rather than bothering with him. Several times he stated that he thought MI5 should find things out about him by asking other people and not him.
3. He stated that he had been visiting prisons in the UK to investigate human rights issues. He stated that he had attended two different law colleges (one being Huddersfield). He then asked about home, particularly the weather, football and Muslim/non-Muslim relations. He stated that GTMO was better than Bagram.

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



5.

6.

7.

8.


9.

10.

11.

12.

13.



Date Report Completed: 13 May 2003 (from contemporaneous notes).



OUT-TELEGRAM

Action:

Info:

Section/Desk:

From:

Date: 21 June 2002

File Ref:

Copied To:

Our Ref:

SUBJECT: Omar Amer DEGHAYES

1. Following our [REDACTED] brief on DEGHAYES [REDACTED] herewith further briefing, the text of [REDACTED] interview with DEGHAYES in Islamabad [REDACTED]

2.

[REDACTED] Suggest you press him hard on these [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] You should also press on his experiences in Bosnia - his story that he was there for purely humanitarian purposes is, of course, rubbish.

[REDACTED] Perhaps you can quiz him on his recent travel. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Interview with DEGHAYES

TEXT BEGINS

Summary

1. DEGHAYES attempts to persuade his [REDACTED] that he is, in fact, his older brother [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] Maintains that his work in Bosnia and Afghanistan was purely charitable, although admits some (limited) contact with the LIFG. Clearly lying about depth of his involvement, and refuses during this interview to cooperate further. No point in re-interviewing him during this deployment unless he indicates he is willing to cooperate.

Detail

2. I [REDACTED] Andrew [REDACTED] interviewed Omar Amer DEGHAYES [REDACTED] from 1430-1630 on 22 May 2002 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The interview lasted approx. two hours with a 30-minute break. DEGHAYES was unrestrained throughout and drank a glass of water. He appeared fit and mentally competent, and confirmed that he was willing to be interviewed.

DEGHAYES Claims He Is Abu Bakr DEGHAYES

3. Immediately after introductions, DEGHAYES started on a list of demands (his word): he wanted news of his wife and child, whom he had not seen for two months; he wanted the British High Commission to intervene on his behalf; and he wanted my full-name as he intended to launch a prosecution on his return to the UK. He said he had been held for two months without charge and this was illegal. He added that he was a British citizen and demanded that the British authorities secure his release. Comment: DEGHAYES was confrontational and energetic at this point [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] asked him if he was a British passport holder. He was: he had a passport in the name of Abu Bakr Amer DEGHAYES. [REDACTED] DEGHAYES said that he was, in fact, Abu Bakr (Omar's older brother). [REDACTED] DEGHAYES said that it QUOTE did not look good UNQUOTE if the British High Commission got involved in his case. He had expected he would be released in a matter of days but now, after two months, he decided he needed the protection afforded by his British citizenship and so revealed his true identity. [REDACTED] remarked that this was scarcely credible but asked him to provide detail on his background to support his story. [REDACTED] warned him that he would need to tell the absolute truth. [REDACTED] wanted to help him but [REDACTED] could not do so unless he was honest. DEGHAYES said he was willing to cooperate and asked for my full-name. I declined to give [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

it and (in response to him pressing me) said I was under no legal obligation to do so.

5.

[REDACTED] He admitted being QUOTE more on the muqatila side UNQUOTE, which he clarified as meaning the LIFG. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6.

[REDACTED]

7.

[REDACTED]

8.

[REDACTED]

9

[REDACTED]

10.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED]

14. [REDACTED]

DEGHAYES Changes His Story

15. [REDACTED] suspended the interview for 30 minutes and, after recommencing, asked DEGHAYES if there was anything he wanted to change about his story. No. [REDACTED] then made it clear that [REDACTED] had been inclined to help him but that [REDACTED] couldn't if he wasn't telling [REDACTED] the truth. [REDACTED] had little

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

time and so he needed to think very carefully about what he now told [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DEGHAYES admitted that he was frightened about being repatriated to Libya. [REDACTED] asked him if he was telling [REDACTED] he was Abu Bakr

(and a UK passport holder) because of this. He admitted that he was, and he was in reality Omar (and therefore not a UK citizen). But (he said immediately) that was the only thing that was untrue about what he had just told [REDACTED]. It was Abu Bakr who had travelled to Libya and he had done so in order to see his family (Abu Bakr was still married to his children's mother). [REDACTED] expressed incredulity again about this, but DEGHAYES insisted it was true, and that Abu Bakr had been imprisoned. [REDACTED]

16. [REDACTED]

17. [REDACTED]

18. [REDACTED]

19. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Bosnia

20. DEGHAYES admitted having been to Bosnia for 2-3 months, specifically Zagreb. He insisted he worked only with the NGO Human Concern. He said did not fight in the Katiba.

Links to the LIFG

21. [REDACTED] asked DEGHAYES to provide information on his LIFG contacts. [REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED]

23. [REDACTED]

24. [REDACTED]

SECRET

25. [REDACTED]

Conclusion

26. [REDACTED]

27. [REDACTED] closed the interview by telling DEGHAYES he needed to think very carefully about the gravity of the situation he was in. He was a Libyan citizen who had been arrested in Pakistan as an illegal entrant. [REDACTED] may well be able to help him but [REDACTED] would not and could not if he continued to withhold information or seek to mislead [REDACTED]. It was obvious from what he had told [REDACTED] that this is what he was doing.

[REDACTED] DEGHAYES reacted rather sarcastically to this by thanking [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] QUOTE concern UNQUOTE, complained that he had cooperated and all he got in return was disbelief, and said he would not cooperate in future. His future, he said, lay not in [REDACTED] hands but in God's. And if God wanted him to be sent to Libya, so be it. The interview ended on a decidedly frosty note.


Comments


28. DEGHAYES turned out to be a surprisingly forceful character whose denials of anything beyond a superficial involvement in the LIFG were robust - although not believable. He is obviously lying about the depth and extent of his involvement. He fits the pattern of a mujahid recruited in the UK, although we found it interesting that he spent so long in Afghanistan [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] His apparent acceptance of the possibility of repatriation to Libya was surprising as he had appeared [REDACTED] sufficiently worried during this interview to lie outrageously about his own identity.


29. [REDACTED]

Text Ends










[REDACTED]




ENDS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE MISSING FROM



COPY

us, as he had been [REDACTED]. We responded that there was little point continuing with the interview if he maintained that attitude. We knew he had lied [REDACTED] and we expected him to be more truthful with us today.

3. He acknowledged that he had made some mistakes but pleaded with us to believe that he was now being honest. We said that we had evidence of his dishonesty, and hoped he would recognise that he was making a big mistake. Give me evidence, he said. We asked him if he had been to Chechnya. He said, never. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He said, forcefully, that this must be a mistake. He swore to Allah that he had never been to Chechnya. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] What really mattered was that we believed it to be the case. Until he convinced us otherwise we would be unable to help him. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He said no. We remained silent.

4. The interview stalled at this point. DEGHAYES was clearly irritated that we disbelieved him and didn't appear to be willing to debate the issue. After a brief period of silence we told him that we would listen to his version of events. He should start from his conversion.

CONVERSION

5. [REDACTED] DEGHAYES explained that before his conversion he had led a Western lifestyle; drinking, going to bars and nightclubs and enjoying his wealth. As was the case throughout the interview, DEGHAYES could not remember precise dates but said that in the early 90s he had been visited by some Tablighis who had encouraged him to embrace Islam. He went with them to the Madina Mosque on one occasion and from then on started praying regularly at home. After some time he started attending the Madina Mosque. [REDACTED] He denied ever being a member of Tablighi Jamaat but said he supported their aims. [REDACTED]

6. In 1992 or 1993, he couldn't remember which, he moved to London to attend University. He lived in Kilburn but couldn't remember the address. He went to Holborn College, London to read law. The College offered degrees from the University of London and the University of Wolverhampton. DEGHAYES graduated after 2 years with a degree for Wolverhampton. DEGHAYES said he had not been involved with any Islamic groups at university but had arranged with the course director for a room to be provided for prayer, which he used regularly. We took this opportunity to explain to DEGHAYES that we were, of course, not concerned by the fact that he had embraced Islam and led a devout life. Our only interest in these events was in the sense that it informed our understanding of his association with others who we knew to be extreme. He said he never travelled overseas during the time he was at university.

7. We asked DEGHAYES if he had become involved with the LIFG when at university. He said he had never been involved with the Fighting Group. We said that we knew that not to be the case and we would like him to tell us about his involvement with the group. He said he supported the aims of the group because Qadaffi had destroyed his people, but he had never been a member. We asked why he hadn't joined if he supported the group. He said that joining any group entailed a commitment which he was not prepared to give.

8. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DEGHAYES started mumbling unconvincingly at this point, saying that Afghanistan was not such an important issue in those days, there was no reason to talk about it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

14. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Again, DEGHAYES started rambling, saying that he lived in a very distinctive house in Brighton and everyone knew he lived there. Consequently many Libyans came to visit him. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Did you talk about the GIA. No, never, the LIFG wouldn't co-operate with the GIA, they were animals and criminals. Whereas the LIFG was only interested in overthrowing Qaddafi, the GIA was so extreme it would even kill women and children. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

16. [REDACTED]

17. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

He repeated the rather tame excuse that it was merely because of his family name. He said, emotionally, that, yes he supported the LIFG, if they wanted him to go and fight in Libya he would go. He told us that he had never told anyone else that, so would we now believe him. We told him this was simply not good enough. We repeated that we wanted to help him but as it was he would be staying in prison for a long time because we knew he was lying. We stressed that we knew about most of his activities already and merely wanted him to confirm



THE SECURITY SERVICE

TEL: [REDACTED]

FAX: [REDACTED]

ACTION
COPY/EXT ONLY

Our Ref: [REDACTED]

Your Ref: [REDACTED]

Date: 30 June 2003

To: DI [REDACTED] MPSB, please copy to D Supt [REDACTED] and DC [REDACTED] SO13

Subject: Interviews of Richard BELMAR.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PASSED IN CONFIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE OF YOUR BRANCH WITHOUT THE PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE SERVICE.

1. Please find below the write up of our interviews with Richard BELMAR which took place at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay on 25 and 28 April 2003.

25 April 2003 interview.

2. It was pointed out to BELMAR that there was no 'timetable for return' to the UK but that by cooperating [REDACTED] he was doing the best thing to help his situation. BELMAR said that he was 'well known here'.

[REDACTED] He did not feel under any pier pressure not to talk to the US authorities. He felt that people in the cell block had cooled down.

3. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

Prisoner Interview Report

Section:	
Reference:	
Drafting Date:	18 June 2003

1. Name of Interviewee: Richard BELMAR
2. Interviewing Officer: [REDACTED]
3. Details of others attending: John [REDACTED] Lucy, [REDACTED] FCO
4. Date, Time and Duration of Interview(s): 25 April 2003; 0958 to 1100
5. Place: [REDACTED] Camp Delta, GTMO
6. Circumstances in which Interview was held (how arranged, facilities used etc.): [REDACTED] Arranged
7. Physical Security measures in place: Subject was shackled to the floor by his feet. His hands were unrestrained.
8. Physical and Mental condition of Interviewee: Subject appeared to be in reasonable mental and physical condition and appeared in a good humour. He stated that he no longer needed an asthma inhaler. He was receiving TB medicine and allergy treatments.
9. Demands/requests made by Interviewee to Interviewer: Subject was keen for a magazine on boxing which we agreed to provide to him [REDACTED]. Through the interview he eat several chocolate bars, and asked if we returned to try to bring him Maryland double chocolate cookies and fruit juice (apple or orange).
10. Additional Comments/remarks: Subject was well and happy to cooperate. He appeared genuine in his attempts to remember details and answer questions as fully as possible. He chatted about the books he was reading, football and boxing, and appeared keen for sporting news. He was told that the lip balm and moisturiser he had asked [REDACTED] for when they last met [REDACTED] and would be passed to him at their next meeting. At the end of the interview he was given tissues which he had requested from [REDACTED] at their last interview.

11. It was pointed out to BELMAR that there was no 'timetable for return' to the UK but that by cooperating [REDACTED] he was doing the best thing to help his situation. BELMAR said that he was 'well known here'.

[REDACTED] He did not feel under any pier pressure not to talk to the US authorities. He felt that people in the cell block had cooled down.

12. [REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

14801017 [REDACTED]

Title: Highlights from GTMO

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Document ID: [REDACTED]

Document
Type: LOOSE MINUTE

Document Title: Highlights from GTMO

Date: 15-sep-2003

Originator: [REDACTED]

File [REDACTED]

References: [REDACTED]

Internal [REDACTED] and
Addressees: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


Document Text

1. The following are the highlights of intelligence from the recent deployment to GTMO. There will be full write-ups of all individual detainees de-briefs to follow.


[REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]



Martin MUBANGA



Richard BELMAR



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

66 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

67 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED] He said that he would be "pissed off" if he "went down" for what he'd done when he had told us everything we wanted to know. He appeared desperate for reassurance that we would help. He said it was his account of the stabbing and the arrest which had put doubts in our minds and it was vital that we contacted his family to resolve this issue - he was adamant he had told us the truth.

26. We then left the interview room for 5 minutes to give him the opportunity to think of any more facts that would help his case. For this time he was alone. When we returned, he appeared to be in a state of anxiety. He said he could not think of anything - he had told us everything he knew. We summed up by saying that there were some obvious "question marks" in his testimony but on the whole we believed that he had been misled and exploited. He had been helpful, although he had not told us everything at the beginning and so we couldn't be sure he was telling us everything now. But, while we could not make any promises, we would do what we can. [REDACTED]

27. We gave BELMAR some shampoo and tissues as he had requested. He appeared genuinely grateful, and shook our hands when we left.

Comments and Recommendations


28. [REDACTED] It is likely that he has presented the circumstances of his recruitment in a slanted way to avoid self-incrimination but we doubt that his involvement is much deeper than he has let on. We think he is genuine in his disillusionment with jihad.

29. [REDACTED]

30. The problem is what happens next. [REDACTED]

31. Our recommendation is, therefore, that if possible (underlined) we seek lenient treatment for BELMAR on the grounds of his

20 June 2002












Security Service
Thames House


cc. 

BELMAR

Dear 

 & RICHARD BELMAR

1. We spoke yesterday about 
2. As I explained, we are finding it increasingly difficult to explain our inability to provide any substantive information on  to his family. We should assume that unless we offer something soon, the family will take the matter up more formally and publicly than to date.
3. I understand that your colleagues en route to Kabul will not be seeing 






4. 



- [REDACTED]
5. We focussed on [REDACTED] when we spoke. We would be grateful too if the same information could be sought on Richard Belmar.

Can an

[REDACTED]

CTPD
WH409
Tel. [REDACTED]



THE SECURITY SERVICE

TEL: [REDACTED]

FAX: [REDACTED]

CC [REDACTED]

Our Ref: [REDACTED]

26 June 2002

[REDACTED] & Richard BELMAR

Please refer to your letter to [REDACTED] dated 20 June. As I explained to [REDACTED] on 24 June I am afraid that in this instance I do not think we can provide welfare information about [REDACTED] and Belmar. [REDACTED]

Although we insist that interviewees are properly treated we have agreed [REDACTED] to stick to intelligence debriefs and not to involve ourselves in Consular/welfare issues. This we leave to the US authorities and other appropriate agencies such as ICRC and yourselves.

2. A second reason is that the level of responsibility on the ground in Afghanistan is at working or tactical level. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] we continue to produce very valuable intelligence via the detainee programme which is of relevance to our National Security.

bcc: [REDACTED]

CTPD

Foreign & Commonwealth Office





Ref: [REDACTED]

3. May I suggest therefore that in the first instance you approach [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

were put into one of 4 groups according to level of fitness and ability; 1 being the most advanced, 4 being the worst. BELMAR was in group 4. Despite his athletic physique, BELMAR claimed that he had lost some basic fitness and behaved lazily while at the camp.


19



20



21 When at the camp BELMAR again became ill and spent some time in the camp hospital.



22



23 Chronologically speaking, this was as far as we got during this debrief. We stopped the interview after 4.5 hours due to BELMAR's deteriorating emotional state. However, during the interview and prompted primarily by the photo album, BELMAR gave some snippets relating to activity both in his past and further into his time in Afghanistan. Please find below this information. Where it applies to activity further into his time in Afghanistan we will elaborate on these points during our next interview.

24



25



[REDACTED]

26

[REDACTED]

27

[REDACTED]

28

[REDACTED]

29

[REDACTED]

30

[REDACTED]

31

[REDACTED]

32

[REDACTED]

33

END

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17 January 2003

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
London SW1A 2AH

from The Foreign Secretary



Dear Colin,

pa m 17/11







Yours ever

Jack

JACK STRAW

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